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Structured Networks
Towards the Well-Designed Matrix
Michael Goold and Andrew Campbell
Many companies face market and competitive conditions that have led them to adopt
multidimensional, matrix organisation structures. But these matrix structures have often
proved difficult for the managers working within them. This article puts forward the
concept of a “structured network” as a means of overcoming the problems typically
associated with traditional matrix organisations.
In structured networks, the organisational units retain considerable autonomy, but
collaborate extensively through voluntary networking between units. The organisation
is largely self-managing, but has sufficient structure, process and hierarchy to achieve
coordination and implement the corporate strategy. The objective is to obtain the
benefits of interdependence that are designed into a typical matrix, but without
sacrificing clear responsibilities, managerial initiative and accountability, speed of
decision-making and lean hierarchy. To design a structured network, it is necessary to
achieve clarity about each unit’s role without hemming managers in with too much
detail. It is also necessary to support mutual learning without compromising distinctive
differences, to defend specialist culture units from domination by mainstream units, to
promote cooperation without embarking on unnecessary synergy initiatives, to
recognise shared responsibilities without diluting unit accountability, and to encourage
the corporate hierarchy to add value without creating redundant overheads and
interference. Organisations designed in this way will have enough, but not too much
structure.
c 2003 Elsevier Ltd.
Introduction
What sort of organisation do corporations need to compete effectively in the complex and fast-
changing world of the twenty-first century? Is a structure with autonomous, self-contained business
units (SBUs) best? Or is a matrix structure with extensive interdependencies between units more
appropriate? And how can the well-known drawbacks of matrices be overcome to produce an
organisation that is well attuned to the current competitive environment and designed to cope
with the management challenges that companies now face?
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Simple SBU-based structures have many advantages, including a clarity of focus on each SBU’s
target markets, speed of decision-making, and strong accountability for results. Companies such
as BP and GE have benefited from establishing business units with extensive decentralized authority
and a high level of commitment to stretching performance objectives.
But many companies have found that self-contained SBUs are not satisfactory if there are mul-
tiple dimensions of competition each of which is important. In the increasingly common situations
where competitive advantage depends on some combination of product excellence, customer-
group understanding and local geographical responsiveness, any self-contained SBU structure will
tend to focus on one dimension of competition at the expense of the others. If the SBUs are
defined around product groups, it will be less easy to create a co-ordinated approach to customers
that buy from more than one product group. Conversely, if the SBUs are defined around customer
segments, it will be harder to build up product strengths that are relevant in multiple customer
segments. In these circumstances, SBUs will have too narrow a focus and too little connection
between them.
…few managers have been comfortable working in matrix structures.
Many experts have argued that a matrix structure is the best way of implementing a strategy
that involves balancing and co-ordinating different dimensions of competition.1 ABB, for example,
extolled the virtues of a matrix structure as a way to create a balance between global product
groups and national operating companies, because the matrix ensured that management attention
would be focused on both these dimensions and on the interdependencies between them.
But few managers have been comfortable working in matrix structures. Most have struggled
with unclear responsibilities, been slowed down by the search for consensus decisions, and had
difficulty with ambiguous hierarchical reporting relationships. For the large majority of managers,
the idea of a matrix structure is now abhorrent. Even ABB and Shell, for long its most powerful
advocates, have moved away from the sort of balanced matrix structures that they previously oper-
ated.
Rather than abandoning the matrix because it does not work, we believe the solution is to
improve the way matrices are designed. By studying companies with matrices that work and by
observing the mistakes managers make when designing matrix structures (see Exhibit 1: The
Research), we believe that a viable and effective type of matrix is possible. But, because managers
have become so suspicious of the word “matrix”, we have chosen to use the more popular and
friendly term “network”.2 A well designed matrix is, in our language, a “structured network”.
In a structured network, the default position is decentralisation
Structured networks avoid the problems of matrices by keeping the amount of structure, process
and central influence to a minimum. Units are defined so that they can be as self-managing as
possible. Collaboration is achieved primarily through self-managed networking between units.
Rules, influence and control from the centre are kept as lean and unobtrusive as possible. In a
structured network, the default position is decentralisation, yet there is just enough structure to
promote the right kind of self-managed behaviour and there are just enough processes, rules and
controls to ensure success. Citicorp’s corporate banking group is a good example. The organisation
is made up of customer-focused units defined around industry sectors, product-focused units
defined around products such as foreign exchange or structured finance, geographically-focused
units defined around countries or regions, and shared infrastructure units in areas such as oper-
ations and technology. All of these units concentrate on specific decentralised responsibilities, and
have a good deal of freedom to make their own decisions. But they also work together extensively
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and voluntarily to serve the end customer, using person-to-person networking supported by agreed
common processes on critical areas of interdependence.
To fulfil its potential, a network must (have) enough structure to
make the whole add up to more than the sum of its parts
Network structures are intended to achieve both the benefits of focus and autonomy associated
with SBU-based structures and the benefits of interdependence, which are designed into matrix
structures. The danger, of course, is that the network ends up instead with the lack of co-operation
of SBUs together with the excessive complexity and ambiguity of the matrix. To fulfil its potential,
a network must be designed with enough structure to make the whole add up to more than the
sum of its parts, but not so much that it inhibits initiative and accountability. There needs to be
a balance between self-management by autonomous, decentralised units and a sufficient level of
structure, process and hierarchical control to facilitate cooperation and interdependence. “Struc-
tured networks” achieve this elusive balance. (See Exhibit 2: Soccer Teams as Structured Networks).
When designing a structured network, managers need to focus on five areas where achieving
the right balance between self-management and structure needs particular attention:
 Achieving clarity about the respective responsibilities of each unit without hemming managers
in with excessive detail.
 Supporting mutual learning between units without compromising units that need to be distinc-
tively different.
 Promoting co-operation between units without embarking on expensive and unnecessary syn-
ergy initiatives.
 Recognising when units have shared responsibilities for results without diluting individual
unit accountability.
 Encouraging upper levels of management in the corporate hierarchy to add value to the
operating units without opening the door to unjustified interference and redundant overheads.
Exhibit 1. The Research
The issues identified and the views presented in this article are based on four years of research with
companies that have multidimensional organisation structures, with important interdependencies
between their operating units. We studied large multinational companies such as 3M, ABB, AstraZeneca,
BP, Citigroup, Dow, GE, IBM, Mars, Monsanto, Motorola, Philips, Shell and Unilever, and several smaller
(but no less multidimensional) companies in sectors such as professional services and speciality chemi-
cals.
In these companies, we spoke with managers at corporate, divisional and operating unit levels, aiming
to understand the reasons why the current organisation had been chosen and the effectiveness with
which it was working. We discussed the competitive challenges faced by the company and the criteria
that had guided the organisation design. We reviewed the formal structure and responsibility definitions,
the reporting relationships and processes, the lateral relationships and processes between units and
the main accountabilities and performance measures. We also discussed whether the interdependencies
between units were being effectively achieved, and what managers saw as the advantages and disad-
vantages of the chosen organisation design. The typical drawbacks and trade-offs of the matrix struc-
tures that we encountered, and the approaches taken to resolving them, led us towards the structured
network concept.
The results of the research are more fully documented in Designing Effective Organisations: How to
Create Structured Networks, Michael Goold and Andrew Campbell, Jossey-Bass, 2002 (San Francisco)
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Exhibit 2. Soccer Teams as Structured Networks
A good illustration of the structured network concept is a soccer team. The coach will decide the
overall formation—for example 4-4-2—in which the team will play. Within this formation each player
should understand his or her basic role (e.g. striker, wing back, central defender, and so on). Players’
roles determine their basic responsibilities, including both their individual specialised tasks and how
they should combine together with other members of the team.
The coach will also work with the team to develop both its tactics and some pre-rehearsed moves.
For example, the tactics may include close man-to-man marking of certain dangerous players on the
other side, how to operate the offside trap, and when to use wing backs in attacking moves down
the flanks. For free kicks around the penalty area and corners, there is likely to be a repertoire of planned
moves, carefully worked through on the training ground, in which each player knows exactly what to
do. As the game unfolds, the coach may modify either the overall formation or the tactics, and the
captain on the pitch will also exert an influence on how members of the team play their roles.
So successful football teams operate with quite a high level of designed-in structure (e.g. players’
roles within a 4-4-2 formation), process (e.g. agreed tactics and rehearsed moves) and hierarchy (e.g.
authority of coach and captain). But everyone recognises that all the players must be free to make
their own judgements about how to handle specific situations as they emerge. A tactical manual that
tried to prescribe each players’ every move would not only be impossible to produce and hopelessly
inflexible, but would also stifle the creativity and flair of the talented individuals that make up the team.
Most of the play needs to depend on spontaneous decisions by each player, within the context of
their agreed roles, not on pre-determined tactics and moves. Too much structure is just as dangerous
as too little.
Ideally, therefore, the team has just enough structure for all the players to combine well together,
but not so much that initiative, flexibility and speed are sacrificed. Most of the play will be guided by
“voluntary networking” between individual players, who are all free to make their own decisions and
choices. But the formation and tactics laid down by the coach give enough coherence and coordination
for the whole team to play well together. This is the essence of a structured network. It is the difference
between the Brazilian side that almost failed to qualify for the 2002 World Cup (a collection of supremely
talented individuals who failed to collaborate and combine together) and the Brazilian side that won
the trophy (the same individuals, but playing effectively together as a team).
In this article we review each of these issues and make proposals for how they should be resolved.
This will illustrate both what a structured network means and how a structured network can
be designed.
Clear responsibilities without excessive detail
Clarity about unit responsibilities is a fundamental requirement, particularly in structures where
units have shared or overlapping responsibilities. Without it, there will be conflict about who
should take the lead on what issues, wrangling about how to discharge shared responsibilities, and
a danger that some important tasks will be overlooked. These are problems that have seriously
damaged many matrix structures.
The obvious answer to a lack of clarity seems to be to specify responsibilities in more detail:
indeed one chief executive told us that the most important lesson he had learned from designing
a new, more interdependent structure was to provide sufficient detail at the outset. Process maps,
decision grids and job descriptions can all be used to lay out how the organisation is meant
to operate.
But there is a limit to how much detail can, or should, be imposed. Weighty manuals laying
out exactly who is responsible for what are seldom useful in guiding day-to-day decisions. One
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reason is that no manual, however detailed, can anticipate all eventualities. Worse still, attempts
to make them comprehensive render them less user-friendly: their length increases, the ‘ifs’ and
‘buts’ proliferate, and their intelligibility declines. An even stronger argument against detailed
responsibility allocations is to avoid bureaucracy and encourage initiative. A flexible structure, in
which responsibilities can evolve to take account of new circumstances, is preferable to a rigid
design that attempts to mandate all responsibilities from the top down.3
When specifying unit responsibilities, organisation designers face a
difficult dilemma between too little clarity and too much detail
When specifying unit responsibilities, organisation designers therefore seem to face a difficult
dilemma between too little clarity and too much detail. Our solution is to make clear design
intentions concerning the basic role of each unit, and then to allow unit managers to take most
decisions for themselves on a self-managed basis. Given a clear specification of the purpose of a
unit and of the type of relationship it should have with other units, unit managers will be able
to work out most of the details for themselves. Some additional details may need to be added to
cope with specific issues, as we shall see later in this article, but in principle clarity about unit
roles is the fundamental requirement.
For example, in Citicorp, with its structure of customer units, product units, geographical units
and shared infrastructure units, there are inevitably issues about what each unit is responsible for
and how they should collaborate. Rather than attempting to lay out all the responsibilities of each
unit in detail, our approach concentrates on basic unit roles. For instance, it would bring out the
role of the product units and the customer units as the main business units, with primary profit
responsibility and authority; of the geographical units as “overlay units” set up to enhance local
responsiveness, but with a need to operate by influencing the product units and the customer
units; and of the infrastructure units as shared services, which should treat other units as customers
whose demands they must attempt to satisfy. An understanding of the purpose and role of each
unit gives guidance to unit managers on how to take most decisions on a self-managed basis, but
in accordance with basic design intentions.
Unfortunately, clear specification of unit roles has been impeded by the lack of an accepted
language for describing different sorts of roles. Terms such as “profit centre” or “product group”
can mean very different things in different companies. To assist in clarifying unit roles, we have
devised a new language or taxonomy of eight unit types, each with basically different roles. The
taxonomy sticks as close as possible to common usage, but gives more clarity about each unit’s
broad responsibilities, lateral relationships and level of autonomy in decision-making.
Business units are market-focussed, profit-responsible units. They can make most of their
decisions without influence from upper levels of management units, and they are expected to
collaborate with sister units only if there is mutual self-interest in doing so. Therefore they have
relatively high decision-making autonomy. Business units are the fundamental building blocks in
most corporate structures.
Business functions such as manufacturing, sales or service, aim to contribute to the success of
the business units through excellence in their respective functional areas. They are subject to the
authority of the business unit’s general manager, who will have substantial influence over their
main decisions, and they are intended to work together closely with other business functions, as
part of a management team in which the business unit’s overall goals take precedence over the
goals of specific functions. Their decision-making autonomy is therefore low.
Sub-businesses are market-focussed units that serve segments defined at a more disaggregated
level than the business units. They may be local regions within national business units, or product
ranges within broader product groups, or narrowly-defined customer segments within a wider
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market. Their purpose is to give more dedicated attention to their specific segments than the
business units would provide. On the other hand, sub-businesses report to the business unit’s
general manager, who has final authority over decisions. The sub-business units’ managers are
expected to balance their segment-specific interests with a concern for the wider business unit’s
goals, and to work together with other sub-businesses as a quasi-team. They are set up to be more
independent and autonomous than business functions, but less than business units.
Overlay units create a focus of attention on segments defined along dimensions that cut across
the business units. For example, if the business units are focussed on products, the overlays may
focus on customer groups or channels. Companies such as 3M, whose business units are defined
around products, have set up overlay units to focus on their retail customers, such as Wal-Mart
or Carrefour. The purpose of an overlay unit is to give extra attention to opportunities in segments
that might otherwise be neglected by the business units. On most issues, overlay units must act
as a pressure group on behalf of their target segments in their relationships with the business
units, pushing hard to influence decisions, but ultimately accepting that the final word rests with
the business units. Overlay units have fewer resources and less autonomy than business units.
Project units carry out tasks or projects that cut across other units, such as the development of
a new product or the construction of a major turnkey facility. The projects normally last for a
finite time period, and give focussed attention to the project, acting, like an overlay unit, as a
pressure group on behalf of the project. The extent of project units’ power and autonomy depends
on the status given to them by senior management, but they must usually rely on the co-operation
of other units.
Shared service units provide services that are needed by several other units in the company. Their
purpose is to achieve economies of scale and scope in activities that are peripheral to other units,
such as transaction processing or IT support. The managers of the shared service unit have con-
siderable discretion about how to manage the service, provided that they treat the user units as
customers, to whose demands the shared service must be responsive. Several companies—such as
ABB, Dupont and Shell—believe that dedicated shared service units can provide major cost savings
and service improvements.
Core research units own and nurture scarce resources, such as R&D in a pharmaceutical company,
that are key to competitive advantage for several business units. Like shared service units, their
purpose is to achieve economies of scale and specialisation, but they also have responsibility for
developing and allocating their resources on behalf of the company. This means that they must
take account of corporate priorities in deciding how to respond to business unit demands. They
will therefore be less autonomous in decisions about how to manage the resources and less purely
responsive to business unit demands than shared service units.
Parent units are upper level management units, such as corporate or divisional headquarters, that
carry out corporate compliance and due diligence tasks, as well as attempting to influence and
add value to other units. These are what we call “parenting” responsibilities.4 Parent units have
a high level of authority over the units that report to them if they choose to use it, but normally
do not interfere with the day-to-day decisions of the operating units. Like the business units,
they collaborate with other units, inside or outside the company, largely on the basis of mutual
self-interest.
Table 1 summarises the characteristics of the eight unit roles we have described.
An understanding of unit roles is a fundamental prerequisite of a
structured network.
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Table 1. Eight unit roles
Responsibility Autonomy Lateral Relationships
Business Unit Market-focussed High Mutual self-interest
Business Function Functional Low Team
Sub-business Market-focussed Some Quasi-team
(disaggregated)
Overlay Unit Market-focussed Some Pressure group
(cut-across)
Project Unit Project-focussed Some Pressure group
Shared Service Unit Service-focussed Fairly High Service provider
Core Resource Unit Resource-focussed Some Resource owner
Parent Unit Parenting High Mutual self-interest
The taxonomy of unit roles gives a useful shorthand for communicating the nature of unit
responsibilities. Organisation designers who were previously failing to make clear their intentions,
or struggling to avoid a morass of details, have found the taxonomy highly valuable. For example,
a multinational consumer products company had encountered long-running friction between their
country management teams and their global product group units. Attempts to resolve these fric-
tions through laying out more fully how a large number of key processes should work had proved
costly and not altogether successful. A focus on the different roles that senior management wanted
the units to play allowed underlying issues to surface much more rapidly, led to a better appreci-
ation of what the chief executive was trying to achieve, and provided ground rules to guide collab-
oration. Once the chief executive had got the country managers to accept that their role was as
an overlay to the global product-based business units, the power struggles and friction subsided
and a more constructive set of relationships began to emerge, in which both country and product
managers were clearer about the spirit in which they should work together.
An understanding of unit roles is a fundamental prerequisite of a structured network. The roles
give sufficient structure to responsibility definitions, by making clear what sorts of behaviour and
interdependencies are appropriate for each unit. But they allow unit managers a good deal of
discretion to take specific decisions on a self-managed basis in accordance with their roles.
Mutual learning without compromising distinctive differences
Current thinking about the sources of competitive advantage stresses the importance of sharing
knowledge across all the units in a company.5 For example, a major theme for GE has been
“boundarylessness”, in which all GE units maximise learning from each other. In the boundaryless
organisation there is extensive cross-unit influence, reinforced by pressure for mutual learning
from upper levels of management. The ‘silo’ thinking of traditional SBUs is replaced by openness
to ideas from outside the unit.
On the other hand, a basic reason for setting up separate organisational units is to encourage
their management teams to specialise and to develop the distinctive competencies needed to suc-
ceed. If a company wants to develop in Eastern Europe, or to exploit a disruptive new technology,
or to build up a research capability in genetics, it is often best to set up a unit dedicated to these
responsibilities. Rather than submerging the responsibilities within a wider unit, such a structure
encourages a focused management team to develop the distinctive expertise that it needs.
The value of setting up a dedicated unit can be particularly high for responsibilities that lie
outside the mainstream of the corporation.6 For example, overlay units that cut across the main
line of reporting, or shared service units that focus on activities that are peripheral for the business
units, may well need skills and priorities that are distinctively different from those in other parts
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of the organisation. Such responsibilities will only be successfully discharged if they are handled
by separate units that develop their own distinctive ways of working, their own “specialist cultures”.
…in matrix structures specialist culture units frequently face the
danger of domination by other mainstream units
But in matrix structures specialist culture units frequently face the danger of domination by
other mainstream units. If the specialist culture unit reports to upper levels of management whose
experience and interests lie elsewhere, or if the specialist culture unit is expected to collaborate
closely with other powerful units and learn from them, there is a risk that the unit will be inhibited.
Interdependence with and learning from the mainstream units may compromise the development
of the specialist culture. BA found it difficult to create a truly low cost culture in its subsidiary,
Go, which had been set up to compete with Ryanair and Easyjet, because there was a pervasive
influence from other parts of the BA corporate culture. Rather than boundaryless behaviour, units
that require specialist cultures need stronger boundaries around them and more protection.
To protect a specialist culture unit from domination, some additional design detail may be
needed. If the unit needs more autonomy than it is likely to receive, given its role, the organisation
designer can reinforce the boundaries around the unit by designing in more powers and protection
for it. For example, a customer overlay unit can be given a right of appeal to senior management
on certain marketing decisions proposed by the product businesses, or a sub-business set up to
focus on a segment with special requirements can be made into a separate business reporting
directly to the division head rather than to the mainstream business general manager.
These measures should create just enough additional structure to protect the specialist cultures
from potentially damaging cross-unit interdependence and learning, but no more. Although some
design refinements may be needed to protect specialist culture units, as much as possible should
still be left to self-management, in accordance with agreed roles. Choosing the right balance is
part of the skill of designing a structured network.
Co-operation without unnecessary synergy initiatives
Organisations that consist of interdependent units depend on links and collaboration between
units. In IBM, the front-end Sales and Distribution Division and Global Service Division must be
able to work together within the back-end Components, PC, Server and Software Divisions. In
3M, the customer overlay units for Wal-Mart and Carrefour must cooperate with the product-
based business units. In AstraZeneca, the Research core resource unit must establish satisfactory
relationships with the geographic market units and the therapy area teams. Linkages between units
are essential to achieve competitive success in multidimensional matrix structures.
…unit managers can be compelled to pursue synergies that turn out
to be mirages.
But bureaucratic co-ordination processes and mechanisms result in costly, slow and inflexible
decisions. An important reason for Shell’s move away from shared responsibilities in a matrix
structure was to reduce the time devoted to consensus-building processes and to become faster
in responding to opportunities and threats. Moreover, if the corporate parent sponsors a whole
series of co-ordination initiatives, unit managers can be distracted from other more important
tasks and compelled to pursue synergies that turn out to be mirages. How many chief executives
who optimistically set up task forces to explore and develop core competencies that could be
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shared across businesses, have found that managers resent the time taken up in the task forces
and eventually conclude that there is little of benefit to share? It is easy to design in too many
co-ordination processes and initiatives, resulting in excessive cost and yielding limited benefit.7
Clarity about unit roles is an essential precondition for avoiding excessive designed-in co-ordi-
nation mechanisms and processes. Provided unit managers understand and accept their roles, and
the relationships with other units implied by them, most co-ordination can be left to self-managed
networking between the managers concerned. Business units will trade with each other or coordi-
nate their pricing to shared customers, if there is mutual self-interest in doing so. Overlay units
will pursue their agendas by actively lobbying the business units that they cut across. Shared service
units will search for ways of satisfying their customers in other units. In most cases, there is no
need for the organisation design to prescribe how these interactions should take place.
But there are some links between units that are likely to be difficult if left to the unit managers.
These include:
 Lack of knowledge about opportunities. If the managers concerned do not have sufficient infor-
mation about other units to know about opportunities to collaborate, there will be problems.
 Different perceptions of costs and benefits. If unit managers disagree about the net benefits
from working together, collaboration will be hard. Particular problems arise if there are win/lose
issues, which create divergent incentives for the units that need to cooperate.
 Personal frictions. Voluntary networking is inevitably harder where there is rivalry, mistrust or
simply antipathy between the individuals involved.
 Frequent/complex negotiations needed. Where there are constant trade-offs to be made, the
negotiation process to reach agreement between units can become extremely costly, slow and
inefficient.
It is for these difficult links that it may be necessary to supplement self-managed networking
with some additional designed-in processes or initiatives. Citigroup and IBM have both developed
detailed relationship planning processes in which the product units, the customer units and the
country units have well-defined responsibilities and through which potentially controversial
decisions about issues such as customer priorities can be handled. Part of these processes is a
recognition that where the units cannot reach agreement between themselves, upper levels of
management will be prepared to arbitrate. BP have set up Peer Groups, in which business unit
managers facing similar issues challenge each other’s targets and performance (“peer challenge”),
and provide assistance to each other (“peer assists”). The Peer Groups also help to allocate capital
between the units in the group. Additional design features of this sort, set up to facilitate links
between units that would otherwise be difficult, are a further part of creating a structured network.8
Shared responsibilities without diluting unit accountability
The accountability process is important in any decentralized organisation. On the one hand, it is a
necessary part of senior managers’ due diligence in checking how well managers with decentralized
responsibilities are performing. On the other, it provides motivation for unit managers to be
strongly committed to delivering good results. Companies such as ABB, BP and GE have empha-
sised the value of clear and stretching performance targets and contracts.
Ideally, accountability concentrates on unit-specific, “bottom-line” or
outcome performance measures.
Ideally, the accountability process concentrates on unit-specific, “bottom-line” or outcome mea-
sures of performance. A bottom-line measure of performance, such as return on capital employed,
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allows upper-level managers to exercise control without checking up on all the details of how the
results have been achieved. Furthermore, giving unit managers freedom to make their own
decisions about how to deliver is less constraining and, hence, more motivating. Accountability
processes based on bottom-line targets yield simpler, lower cost control for upper-level managers
and stronger commitment from unit managers.
But in matrix structures with interdependent units the accountability process must recognise
that many responsibilities are shared. In Citigroup, Shell and Unilever, for example, country units
must work together with global or regional product units to serve their markets. As a result,
unit-specific, bottom-line goals are less feasible. Instead, it is necessary to monitor the respective
contributions of different units to shared goals, implying a focus on inputs as well as outputs. To
what extent, for example, were the efforts of the local country units or the global product units
responsible for improved results in certain segments? To answer this question, it is necessary to
dig down into how the results were achieved, and who contributed what to them. This inevitably
makes the accountability process more complex and can reduce individual unit accountability.
…there is a balance to be struck between recognising shared
responsibilities and diluting individual unit accountability
But there is a balance to be struck between recognising shared responsibilities and diluting
individual unit accountability. The control process should recognise shared accountabilities, but
search for appropriate unit-specific output-oriented performance measures wherever possible. In
Citigroup, for example, a sophisticated balanced business score-card is used to monitor unit per-
formance, using measures such as customer satisfaction, share of customer “wallet”, product rank-
ings in comparison to competition, and profitability. The measures are tailored for each unit and
focus on things over which the unit has the greatest influence, and hence the strongest account-
ability. Shared responsibilities are recognised, but the goal is a control process that nevertheless
preserves strong unit accountability.
In a structured network, therefore, the accountability process is designed, as far as possible,
around unit-specific, bottom-line performance measures. But it also takes account of shared
responsibilities in the way that senior managers interpret the results achieved. Upper-level man-
agers have to know enough about how units have worked together to form a valid judgement
about how well each unit is performing. Choosing the appropriate performance measures and
making sure that upper level managers have sufficient skill and time to understand what is going
on are parts of the challenge of designing a structured network.
Value added hierarchy without redundant costs and interference
The philosophy of the structured network is to decentralise decisions to unit managers, who gener-
ally have the most detailed knowledge about the issues involved. Upper levels in the hierarchy
only have a role to play if they are discharging tasks that unit managers are not so well placed to
handle; in other words, if they are able to add some value through their interventions. If the
hierarchy does not have a clear value added role, it is likely to incur unjustifiable overheads and
fall into value destroying interference.9
Upper levels in the hierarchy only have a role to play if they are able
to add some value through their interventions
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As companies focus down on fewer, less diverse businesses, with more overlaps, upper level
managers are often drawn into reserving or sharing more responsibilities. For example, in compa-
nies such as AstraZeneca or Monsanto with important core resource units, parent managers must
be involved in decisions about how best to allocate and use these resources. And in professional
service firms, the managing partner frequently needs to arbitrate between different views concern-
ing new service lines and new offices, client priorities, and partner elections. In these situations,
upper levels of management are integral to sound decisions.
In addition, the senior management team often has a role to play in matrix structures in protect-
ing specialist cultures, facilitating difficult links, and exercising complex accountabilities, as
described in previous sections. Skilled senior managers in the corporate parent, alert to the opport-
unities to add value and their role in making the structure work well, are essential to the success
of the structured network.
But there remains a danger from too much hierarchy. Bloated, interfering, and over-mighty
upper levels of management can easily counteract any good that they do. For example, a series
of duplicative reviews at division, group and corporate level will frequently slow down decisions
and result in less well-informed choices. Moreover corporate chief executives who, despite limited
knowledge of the opportunities, insist on pushing their pet projects such as unpopular new product
developments, or shared sales offices that will not meet the true needs of the businesses concerned,
can cause real damage. And ambiguous reporting relationships to multiple bosses in different
dimensions of the matrix can lead to endless friction and confusion.
A structured network therefore designs in hierarchy that has a clear value-added role, but elimin-
ates redundant hierarchy. Each level in the hierarchy should be challenged to assess whether it
adds value or is superfluous. And all responsibilities retained at upper levels should be tested
against the value-added criterion. This is the way to ensure that the hierarchy adds value, but
without redundant costs and influence.
Enough, but not too much structure
In to-day’s competitive environment, many companies have found that a focus on a single dimen-
sion of competition is not sufficient. Companies such as ABB, Citigroup, IBM and Shell feel the
need to give attention to customer segments that cut across product groups, to geographical areas
in which these customers are served and the products are delivered, and to shared resources and
common services which underpin all their operations. In these circumstances, some form of matrix
structure that requires different organisational units to work together interdependently is likely to
be the preferred organisation design.
But matrix structures have often proved cumbersome and confusing for the managers working
within them. They have designed in interdependence, but at the cost of blurring responsibilities,
slowing down decisions, inhibiting management initiative and autonomy and diluting personal
accountability. Matrix structures have also become notorious for ambiguous reporting relation-
ships and top-heavy hierarchies. But we do not believe that organisation designers should, as a
result, throw out the matrix structure. Rather, they need to find ways of designing matrix structures
that will deliver the interdependencies that many companies need, but without the drawbacks that
characterise so many traditional matrix organisations.
The default position remains self-management: it is only tampered
with when the need is clear.
It is for this purpose that we put forward the concept of a structured network. The essential
idea behind a structured network is to design in only enough structure, process and hierarchy to
deal effectively with awkward interdependent responsibilities, not so much as to inhibit unit self-
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Table 2. Structured networks: enough, but not too much structure
Design Challenges Structured Networks Drawbacks in Traditional Matrix
Structures
1. Responsibility definition Enough clarity on roles, but not too Either confusion or excessively
much detail detailed responsibility manuals
2. Interdependence and mutual Enough interdependence and mutual Compromises for specialist cultures
learning learning, but not too much pressure to
conform
3. Co-ordination and linkages Enough solutions for difficult links, but Coordination processes and
not too much interference with voluntary initiatives which take too long and
networking don’t pay off
4. Accountability Enough recognition of shared Costly monitoring and weakened
responsibilities, but not too much commitment to deliver
dilution of unit accountability
5. Hierarchy Enough hierarchy to add value, but not Redundant hierarchy that destroys
too much cost and interference more value than it adds
management and initiative. The default position remains self-management: it is only tampered
with when the need is clear. In this way, the structured network achieves the benefits of a matrix
structure but without its usual failings.
In Table 2, we summarise how structured networks deal with the design challenges we have
identified and discussed, contrasting this with the characteristic drawbacks of traditional matrix
structures. Structured networks achieve a balance between the interdependence that is encouraged
by the matrix and the autonomy and self-management that managers need to discharge their
responsibilities effectively. They therefore avoid the slowness, complexity and bureaucracy of the
matrix, but without falling into the narrowness and parochialism of single dimension SBUs.
The key to designing a structured network is to think through how the elusive balance between
enough and too much structure can be achieved. First, it is necessary to establish a design blueprint
with clear roles for each unit. Then, enough additional structure, process and hierarchy should
be added to the basic design to address each of the other design challenges, but no more. Organis-
ations designed in this way will be structured networks, with just enough, but not too much, struc-
ture.
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